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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a zero-sum undiscounted stochastic game which
has finite state space and finitely many pure actions. Also, we assume the
transition probability of the undiscounted stochastic game is controlled by
one player and all the optimal strategies of the game are strictly positive.
Under all the above assumptions, we show that the β-discounted stochas-
tic games with same payoff matrices and β sufficiently close to 1 are also
completely mixed. We also provide a necessary condition under which the
individual matrix games are completely mixed. We also show that, if we
have non-zero value in some state for the undiscounted stochastic game then
for β sufficiently close to 1 the β-discounted stochastic game also possess
nonzero value in the same state.
Keywords: Undiscounted stochastic game, Discounted stochastic game, Lim-
iting average payoff, Completely mixed game, Single player controlled transition,
Zero-sum stochastic game, Matrix game.
1 Introduction
Stochastic game was first introduced by Shapley in 1953 ([Shapley(1953)]). In his
paper, Shapley showed the existence of value of a stochastic game and stationary
optimal strategies for zero-sum, β-discounted stochastic games. Zero-sum undis-
counted stochastic game was first introduced by Gillette ([GILLETTE(1957)]).
He show that unlike β-discounted stochastic game, there may not exist stationary
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optimal strategies in the undiscounted stochastic game. Blackwell and Ferguson
([Blackwell and Ferguson(1968)]) studied Gillette’s example and showed that this
game does possess an ǫ-optimal behavior strategy for player I and a stationary op-
timal strategy for player II. In the year 1985, Filar ([Filar(1981)]) introduced the
completely mixed stochastic game, this is an extension of the completely mixed
matrix game defined by Kaplansky in 1945 ([Kaplansky(1945)]). Kaplansky’s
paper provides us many properties of a completely mixed matrix game which
general matrix game does not have. Shapley’s construction of shapley matrix
([Shapley(1953)]) naturally extended most of the properties of completely mixed
matrix game to completely mixed discounted stochastic game. Filar extended some
of the results of completely mixed matrix game to the case of completely mixed
undiscounted stochastic game under the assumption of single player controlled
transition probability.
In this paper, we show that under the assumption of single player controlled
transition probability, the undiscounted stochastic game is completely mixed fol-
lows that the β-discounted stochastic games are completely mixed for β sufficiently
closed to 1. Also, we provide some necessary condition under which the individual
matrix game are completely mixed. We provide a counterexample for the converse
of our result.
2 Definition and preliminaries
Stochastic game was first formulated by Shapley ([Shapley(1953)]). For a finite
state and finite action two players zero-sum stochastic game, the game is played
within two players (known as player 1 and player 2) and played in every day. In
a specific day, the game will be in a specified state s and both player will play
a matrix game R(s) and will get some reward which will add up to zero. Then
the game will move to a new state in the next day and continuous on indefinitely.
Throughout the rest of the paper unless stated otherwise we will be assuming
player 1 tries to maximize his or her profit and player 2 tries to minimize the
same.
Definition 1 (Two person zero-sum finite stochastic game). A finite zero-sum
two person stochastic game can be think of a 5 tuple G = (S,A1, A2, r, q).The
game is played between two players, player 1 and player 2. S is the set of all
states in the stochastic game. We denote S = {s1, s2, · · · , sK} as state space is
finite. A1 and A2 be respectively the set of all pure actions available for player
1 and player 2 respectively. ie. in state s ∈ S player i for i = {1, 2} have pure
actions Ai(s) = {1, 2, · · · , mi}. r is the reward function and q is the transition
probability matrix. If in state s ∈ S, player 1 and player 2 chooses pure action i
and j respectively then the payoff player 1 gets in that specific day is r(s, i, j) and
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player 2 gets is −r(s, i, j) and the with probability q(s′|s, i, j) the game moves to
state s′ in the next day.
The payoff matrix in state s ∈ S is denoted as follows.
R(s) = (r(s, i, j))m1×m2 .
In general, the strategy for a player can depend on the whole history up to present
day, but we will be considering only that strategies which do not depend on the
previous history, ie. if the game is in state s0 ∈ S today then for different past
history of reaching s0 both the player’s strategy will be exactly same. This history
independent strategy is known as stationary strategy.
Definition 2 (Stationary strategy). Denote PAk for k ∈ {1, 2} be the set of all
probability distribution of player k’s action space Ai. Then a stationary strategy
of player k is a function from state space S to the space PAk .
Definition 3 (Undiscounted payoffs for zero-sum stochastic game). Denote,
r(n)(s0, f
0, g0) be the expected reward player 1 gets at nth day if the game starts
in state s0, and player 1 and player 2 plays the strategy f
0 and g0 respectively.
If player 1 and player 2 plays the stationary strategy f 0 and g0 respectively
and the game starts in state s0 ∈ S then the undiscounted payoff player 1 and
player 2 gets respectively is Φ(f 0, g0)(s0) and −Φ(f
0, g0)(s0). Where,
Φ(f 0, g0)(s0) = lim sup
N↑∞
[
1
N + 1
N∑
n=0
r(n)(s0, f
0, g0)
]
.
The undiscounted payoff is also known as limiting average payoff.
Definition 4 (β-discounted payoffs for zero-sum stochastic game). If player 1
and player 2 plays strategy f 0 and g0 respectively and the game starts in state
s0 ∈ S then the limiting average payoff player 1 and player 2 gets respectively is
Iβ(f
0, g0)(s0) and −Iβ(f
0, g0)(s0). Where,
Iβ(f
0, g0)(s0) =
∞∑
n=0
βnr(n)(s0, f
0, g0).
Definition 5 (Optimal strategy and value of the stochastic game). A pair of
stationary strategy (f 0, g0) is said to be an optimal strategy in an undiscounted
stochastic game if for the stochastic game we have,
Φ(f 0, g0) ≥ Φ(f, g0) coordinate-wise, for all f ∈ PA1 .
Φ(f 0, g) ≥ Φ(f 0, g0) coordinate-wise, for all g ∈ PA2.
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where, Φ(f, g0) = (Φ(f, g0)(s1),Φ(f, g
0)(s2), · · · ,Φ(f, g
0)(sK)
T . The value of the
undiscounted stochastic game in state s ∈ S is denoted as v(s) = Φ(f 0, g0)(s).
A pair of stationary strategy (f 0, g0) is said to be an optimal strategy in the
β-discounted stochastic game if we have,
Iβ(f
0, g0) ≥ Iβ(f, g
0) coordinate-wise, for all f ∈ PA1 .
Iβ(f
0, g) ≥ Iβ(f
0, g0) coordinate-wise, for all g ∈ PA2.
where, Iβ(f, g
0) = (Iβ(f, g
0)(s1), Iβ(f, g
0)(s2), · · · , Iβ(f, g
0)(sK)
T . The value of the
β-discounted stochastic game in state s ∈ S is denoted as vβ(s) = Iβ(f
0, g0)(s).
The value of a stochastic game is always unique, whereas the optimal strategy
of a stochastic game may not be unique.
Definition 6 (Single player controlled stochastic game ([Parthasarathy and Raghavan(1981)])).
A stochastic game is called single player controlled stochastic game if the transition
probability is controlled only by one player. For a player 2 controlled stochastic
game, we have, q(s′|s, i, j) = q(s′|s, j) for all s, s′ ∈ S, i ∈ A1 and j ∈ A2.
Through out the rest of the paper, unless stated otherwise we will be consid-
ering player 2 controlled stochastic game.
Definition 7 (Completely mixed stochastic game([Filar(1981)])). A stochastic
game is said to be completely mixed if every optimal strategy for both the players
are completely mixed. ie. for both player1 and player 2 in each state s ∈ S all
the pure actions i and j for player 1 and player 2 are played with strictly positive
probability.
Under the assumption of player 2 controlled stochastic game, The transition
probability matrix Q(g) for some stationary strategy g of player 2, is defined as
Q(g) = (q(s′|s, g))K×K.
For a stationary strategy (f, g) the reward vector is defined as
r(f, g) = (r(f, g, s1), · · · , r(f, g, sK))
T
with, r(f, g, s) = f(s)TR(s)g(s).
Now the discounted and undiscounted payoff for the stationary strategy (f, g)
can be written as-
Iβ(f, g)(s) = {[I − βQ(g)]
−1r(f, g)}s and
Φ(f, g)(s) = {Q∗(g)r(f, g)}s
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Where, Q0(g) = I and the markov matrix Q∗(g) is as follows.
Q∗(g) = lim
n→∞
1
N + 1
N∑
n=0
Qn(g).
The following results will be used to proof our results.
Result 1.([Kaplansky(1945)], theorem 1 page 475) Consider a two person zero sum
matrix game with payoff matrix M ∈ Rm×n. Suppose player 2 has a completely
mixed optimal strategy y′ then for any optimal strategy strategy x′ for player 1,
we have
m∑
i=1
mijx
′
i ≡ v for all j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. Where, v is the value of the matrix
game.
Result 2.([Parthasarathy and Raghavan(1981)]) For player 2 controlled stochastic
game if fβ is optimal stationary strategy for player 1 in the β-discounted stochastic
game and if fβ → f 0 component wise then,
lim
β↑1
(1− β)Iβ(f
β, g) ≡ Φ(f 0, g)
for any player 2’s stationary strategy g. We also have-
v(s) = lim
β↑1
(1− β)vβ(s) for all s ∈ S.
3 Results
Lemma 1. Assume player 2 controlled transition. Suppose, ∃ β0 ∈ [0, 1) and
a completely mixed stationary strategy g0 such that g0 is optimal for player 2
(Minimizer) in every β-discounted stochastic game for for all β > β0. Let, βn ∈
[β0, 1) be such that βn ↑ 1. Let {fn} be optimal for player 1 (Maximizer) for βn-
discounted stochastic game. Suppose fn → f0 coordinate-wise, ie. fn(s) → f0(s)
for each state s ∈ S the f0 is optimal for player 1 in the undiscounted stochastic
game.
Proof. From ([Parthasarathy and Raghavan(1981)]) we have under one player con-
trolled transition probability, a undiscounted stochastic game has value restricted
to stationary strategy. Suppose fn is optimal for βn-discounted stochastic game.
As we have a completely mixed strategy g0 for player 2 in the βn-discounted
stochastic game form result 1 ([Kaplansky(1945)]) we have-
Iβn(fn, g) ≡ vβn
for any stationary strategy g for player 2, where Iβn(fn, g) = (Iβn(fn, g)(s1), · · · ,
Iβn(fn, g)(sK))
T and vβn = (vβn(s1), · · · , vβn(sK)).Therefore we have [I−βnQ(g)]
−1
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r(fn, g) ≡ vβn. Now we have [I−βnQ(g)] is a non-negative matrix hence the inverse
is also a non-negative matrix. Hence we have the expression of r(fn, g) as follows.
r(fn, g) ≡ [I − βnQ(g)]vβn
Now we have fn → f0 point-wise and the reward function r(., .) is a continuous
function of the strategy of player 1. Hence, for any given ǫ > 0 we have,
[I − βnQ(g)]vβn − ǫe ≤ r(f0, g) ≤ [I − βnQ(g)]vβn + ǫe
coordinate-wise for all n ≥ N0, for some N0. e is a suitable length column vector
with all entry as 1. Therefore we have,
vβn − ǫ[I − βnQ(g)]
−1e ≤ [I − βnQ(g)]
−1r(f0, g) ≤ vβn + ǫ[I − βnQ(g)]
−1e.
As, (1− βn) is always non-negative for all βn ∈ (0, 1], we have.
(1− βn)vβn − (1− βn)ǫ[I − βnQ(g)]
−1e ≤ (1− βn)[I − βnQ(g)]
−1r(f0, g)
≤ (1− βn)vβn + (1− βn)ǫ[I − βnQ(g)]
−1e.
We have, [I − βnQ(g)]
−1e = [
∞∑
k=0
βknQ
k(g)]e =
∞∑
k=0
βkn[Q
k(g)e] =
∞∑
k=0
βkne as Q
k
is a stochastic matrix for each k. Therefore the above inequality reduces to the
following inequality.
(1− βn)vβn − ǫe ≤ (1− βn)[I − βnQ(g)]
−1r(f0, g) ≤ (1− βn)vβn + ǫe.
Now if we let βn ↑ 1 from result 2 ([Parthasarathy and Raghavan(1981)]) the above
inequality will look as follows.
v − ǫe ≤ Φ(f0, g) ≤ v + ǫe.
Where, v = (v(s1), · · · , v(sK))
T is the value of the undiscounted stochastic game.
This is true for any ǫ > 0. Hence f0 constricted above is optimal strategy for
player 1 in the undiscounted stochastic game.
Theorem 1. Consider a finite, undiscounted, zero-sum, single player controlled
stochastic game Γ, which is completely mixed. Then ∃ β0 ∈ [0, 1) such that
∀ β > β0 the β−discounted stochastic game Γβ obtained from the same payoff
matrices are completely mixed.
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Proof. Let us assume for contradiction that the undiscounted stochastic game is
completely mixed but there does not exist any 0 ≤ β0 < 1 such that the β-
discounted game are completely mixed for all β > β0.
Then we can find a β1 ∈ (β0, 1) such that there will exists a non-completely
mixed strategy f1 which is optimal for the β1-discounted stochastic game.
Similarly, we can find a β2 ∈ (β1, 1) such that there will exist a non-completely
mixed strategy f1 which is optimal for the β2-discounted stochastic game, as we
have the above assumptions.
Hence we will get a sequence βn ↑ 1 such that for all βn-discounted game we
have non-completely mixed strategy fn. But we have finitely many states and
finitely many pure actions in the stochastic game. Hence there exists a state s¯
and a pure action i for player 1 such that the ith coordinate of fn(s¯) is zero for
infinitely many fn. ie. we can find a sub-sequence fnk of fn for which a fixed
state s¯ and a fixed pure action i can be found, such that the ith pure strategy in
the s¯th state is always played with zero probability in the optimal strategy . So
applying the previous lemma, limit of this sub-sequence fnk of fn (denote as f0)
is optimal strategy for player 1 in the undiscounted game. f 0 is not completely
mixed but optimal in the undiscounted stochastic game. This is a contradiction.
So we can find a β0 ∈ [0, 1) such that ∀ β > β0 the β−discounted stochastic game
Γβ obtained from the same payoff matrices are completely mixed.
The converse of the above theorem is not true. Let us consider an example of
finite player 2 controlled zero-sum stochastic game where the β-discounted stochas-
tic game is completely mixed for all β ∈ [0, 1) but the undiscounted stochastic game
is not completely mixed.
Example 1.
s1 =
[
0/(0, 1) 2/(0, 1)
3/(0, 1) 1/(0, 1)
]
, s2 =
[
2/(0, 1) 0/(0, 1)
0/(0, 1) 2/(0, 1)
]
Note: s2 is an absorbing state.
Consider the β-discounted game Γβ with the mentioned states and actions.
The Shapley matrix ([Shapley(1953)]) Rβ(s1) is given by,
Rβ(s1) =

0 +
β
1− β
2 +
β
1− β
3 +
β
1− β
1 +
β
1− β


Clearly, the matrix Rβ(s1) is completely mixed for all β ∈ [0, 1).
Rβ(s2) is also completely mixed. Hence the game Γβ is completely mixed for all β.
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But if we consider the undiscounted stochastic game Γ. Consider the strategy f
with f(s1) = (1, 0), f(s2) = (.5, .5). f is a stationary optimal strategy for player 1
in the undiscounted stochastic game Γ. Hence the game Γ is not completely mixed
(has one optimal stationary strategy which is not completely mixed).
Lemma 2. Let, A = (aij) be a symmetric matrix of order n with aij > 0 for every
i and j. Let bT = (b1, b2, · · · , bn) be a non-negative vector. Let, C = (cij) where
cij = aij + bj. Suppose C is a completely mixed matrix game. Then, A is also a
completely mixed matrix game.
Proof. Suppose, C is completely mixed. Since the value v of C is positive, from
Kaplansky ([Kaplansky(1945)]) det(C) 6= 0. Also from a result of Parthasarathy
and Raghavan ([Parthasarathy and Raghavan(1981)]) det(A) 6= 0.
Let y be a completely mixed optimal strategy for C. Then Cy = ve, where e is
a vector with all coordinates equals to 1. It follows Ay = (v − bT y)e = δe, where
δ = v− bty. Since A is symmetric, it follows that δ is the value of the matrix game
A and y is optimal strategy for A.
To complete the proof we will show that y is the only optimal strategy for
both players in game A. Let, z be any optimal strategy of A. Then Az = δe,
since y is a completely mixed optimal for both players. We also have Ay = δe.
Thus A(y − z) equals to zero vector. Since A is non-singular, y = z. In other
words, every optimal strategy coincides with y. This terminates the proof of the
lemma.
We now give a simple counter example to show that if A is completely mixed
matrix game, then C need not be completely mixed matrix game.
Example 2. Let, A =
[
1 2
2 1
]
and let b = (b1, b2) = (1, 2). Then C =
[
2 4
3 3
]
.
Note A is completely mixed matrix game but C is not completely mixed matrix
game.
Lemma 2 holds if we assume a pare of completely mixed optimal strategies
exist for the two players in C instead of assuming C to be a completely mixed
matrix game.
Theorem 2. Consider a finite, undiscounted, zero-sum, single player controlled
stochastic game Γ which is completely mixed. Also assume that the all the individ-
ual payoff matrix R(s) are symmetric. Then the individual matrix game R(s) is
completely mixed for all s ∈ S.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality R(s) is positive, that is every entry in
R(s) is positive. Take any β > β0. Then the game Rβ(s) is completely mixed,
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where Rβ(s) = R(s) + b(s), with bj(s) = β
∑
s′
vβ(s
′)q(s′|s, j). Now the result
follows from main theorem 1 and lemma 2.
Let us consider an example of a single player controlled undiscounted finite
stochastic game which is completely mixed.
Example 3.
R(s1) =
[
2/(1, 0) 0/(0, 1)
0/(1, 0) 2/(0, 1)
]
, R(s2) =
[
3/(1, 0) −1/(0, 1)
−1/(1, 0) 3/(0, 1)
]
This is a player 2 controlled stochastic game with 2 states S1 and S2. Player
2 controllers the transition. In both S1 and S2 is player 2 chooses column 1 the
game moves to S1 in the next states and if player 2 chooses column 2 then the
game moves to S2 in the next state.
The unique optimal strategy for player 1 is {(1/2,1/2),(1/2,1/2)} for the above
mentioned game. ie. choosing row 1 and row 2 is state S1 with probability .5 and
.5 respectively and choosing row 1 and row 2 is state S2 with probability .5 and .5
respectively. The unique optimal strategy for player 2 is {(1/2,1/2),(1/2,1/2)} for
the above mentioned game.
In example 14, we can see that for all β ∈ [0, 1) the β-discounted stochastic
game Γβ is completely mixed. As both S1 and S2 are symmetric matrix theorem
11 says individual matrix game are completely mixed, which is easy to see in the
above example.
Theorem 3. Assume a player 2 controlled stochastic game. Let, v(s) and vβ(s)
be the value of a undiscounted and β-discounted stochastic game respectively.
If v(s) 6= 0 for some s ∈ S then ∃ β > β0 such that vβ(s) 6= 0.
Proof. We have v(s) 6= 0. Then from ([Parthasarathy and Raghavan(1981)]) there
exist (f 0, g0) optimal in Γ such that lim
β↑1
fβ(s) = f 0. And (fβ, g0) is optimal
stationary strategy in Γβ for all β > β0. Now without loss of generality we assume
v(s) > 0. v(s) = Φ(f 0, g0)(s) 6 Φ(f 0, g)(s) for all g ∈ PA2 . Then, Φ(f
0, g0)(s) >
0. Implies, lim
β↑1
(1− β)Iβ(f
0, g0)(s) > 0. Implies, lim
β↑1
(1− β)Iβ((lim
β↑1
fβ), g0)(s) > 0.
This follows, lim
β↑1
(1 − β)Iβ(f
β, g0)(s) > 0. Then, Iβ(f
0, g0)(s) > 0 for all β > β0
for some fixed β0. Hence we have, vβ(s) > 0 for all β > β0 for some fixed β0.
Remark: The converse of the above theorem is not true.The following example
is a counter example.
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Example 4. Consider the following stochastic game -
R(s1) =
[
4/(0, 1, 0) 2/(0, 0, 1)
3/(0, 1, 0) 1/(0, 0, 1)
]
, R(s2) =
[
2/(0, 1, 0) 0/(0, 1, 0)
0/(0, 1, 0) 2/(0, 1, 0)
]
,
R(s3) =
[
1/(0, 0, 1) −1/(0, 0, 1)
−1/((0, 0, 1) 1/(0, 0, 1)
]
Note: s2 and s2 are absorbing states. In state 1 (denoted as s1) the auxiliary
game is defined as- Rβ(s1). Therefore for all β ∈ [0, 1) val(Rβ(s1)) = 3.
But the undiscounted value in state 1 is given by- v(s) = lim
β↑1
(1− β)vβ(s) = 0.
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